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On 2 October 1994, Derrida participated in a discussion to mark the opening of a new 
doctoral programme in the philosophy department at the University of Villanova.  On two 
occasions he tells his audience that the next day his latest work, Politics of Friendship, will 
be published in Paris: it is the day before the politics of friendship.  Derrida goes on to say 
that his new work is ‘mainly a book on Plato and Aristotle’ and adds, ‘I think we need to read 
them again and again and I feel that, however old I am, I am on the threshold of reading Plato 
and Aristotle.  I love them and I feel I have to start again and again and again.  It is a task 
which is in front of me, before me’.  Derrida reiterates not once but five times that when it 
comes to Plato and Aristotle one must start again – and again and again.  At the same time, 
in Of Spirit Derrida had also insisted that ‘it is already too late, always too late’.  One cannot, 
and must not, be beguiled by the possibility of a pure ‘recommencement’, by a ‘return’ that 
would ‘signify a new departure … or some degree zero’.  It is always too late to start again.  
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The gesture of starting again is itself already part of the tradition of metaphysics: metaphysics 
always starts again – and always with itself, with Plato and Aristotle. 
Some thirty years earlier in ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’, Derrida had already 
alluded to a turning back, to a backwards turn, that can be described neither simply as a 
starting again nor merely as a starting too late.  From the start, he writes, we are presented 
with ‘the choice and division between the two ways separated by Parmenides in his poem, the 
way of the logos and the non-way, the labyrinth, the “palintrope” in which the logos is lost’.  
To start with and without Parmenides, with and without ontology, Derrida suggests, one must 
start with, be startled by, a palintrope, with a turning back that turns once more and always 
more than once – and loses the logos.  It is this palintropic movement that Derrida evokes in 
‘Force and Signification’ when he argues that phenomenology ‘leads Husserl back to Plato’, 
and in ‘The Pit and the Pyramid’, when he writes that Hegel ‘takes us back … to Aristotle’.   
In On Touching there is perhaps an unavoidable history of palintropes, as ‘the history of 
the departures from totality’, in Derrida’s reading of Aristotle’s De Anima, On the Soul. 
These histories of ‘tropological play’, as he calls them, these improprieties of the proper 
sense, these meetings or duels, these rencontres between the senses, are unavoidable in trying 
to reach (toucher) On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy (205).  As if one could avoid the ‘images, 
phantasms, and spectres, that is, figures, tropes, allegories, or metonymies opening a path to 
technics’ (52).  Derrida writes in the opening pages that the aporias of De Anima leave us 
‘without any hope of stepping across them, or coming out on top, on the bottom, or by 
sidestepping – and even less stepping back, or running to safety before them’ (4).  As the 
twists and turns and returns of the remarkable eight-year span of On Touching suggests, it is 
perhaps already impossible to start again always too late.  On can only turn again and always 
more than once.  As Derrida writes of Nancy’s ‘Psyche’: ‘He starts off, then begins again, 
more than once, compulsively’ (11).   
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As Derrida argues at the end of On Touching, one must attend to both the logic and the 
rhetoric, ‘which would be more than a rhetoric’, of touching on touch (299).  Reading 
Lévinas on the equivocal caress, he writes: ‘This does not forbid the promise but makes us 
call into question again, once more, all the analyses of the promise and its performative 
value’ (83).  And later, still in the first part of the work: ‘I therefore return – I turn around, 
toward Jean-Luc Nancy’ (93); or, ‘we turn … from one “turn” towards other “turns” ’ (130).  
‘‘May I’, he asks at the opening of the first part, ‘even before starting out again, be permitted 
the space and the freedom of a long parenthesis’ (20, my emphasis).  A hundred and twenty 
pages later, at the opening of the second part, Derrida writes: ‘Let us start again’ (160).  And 
again in Tangent V: ‘Let us start over again’ (244).  And perhaps most of all in the third part, 
‘Punctuations: “And you” ’, when he pleads: ‘Make believe I’m starting over again, since I 
obviously and avowedly have the feeling I can never get to it, to the truth, and I can never 
touch the point of departure, not to mention the end’ (277). 
 
I. THE DIAPHANOUS 
 
It is appropriate that Derrida’s first quotation of Aristotle, in his introduction to The Origin 
of Geometry, is from De Anima.  It is crucial to phenomenology, Derrida argues, that Husserl 
excludes the ‘Idea in the Kantian sense’ itself from the phenomenological analysis.  
Phenomenology is concerned both with what appears and with ‘the possibility of its 
appearing’.  The ‘Idea in the Kantian sense’ – ‘the regulative possibility of appearing’ – is the 
standard and guarantee of phenomenology.  What interests Derrida is that, as the  “origin” of 
phenomenology, the Idea itself ‘can never appear as such’.  It is to illustrate this point that 
Derrida first turns to De Anima.  He writes: 
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It is not by chance that there is no phenomenology of the Idea.  The latter cannot 
be given in person, nor determined in an evidence, for it is only the possibility of 
evidence and the openness of “seeing” itself; it is only determinability as the 
horizon for every intuition in general, the invisible milieu of seeing analogous to 
the diaphaneity of the Aristotelian Diaphanous, an elemental third, but the one 
source of the seen and the visible. 
 
The ‘diaphanousness of pure ideality’, Derrida goes on to say, is for Husserl the invisible 
origin of the visible as a pure objective ideality, of a visible that has liberated itself from the 
sensible and the imaginary.  A year later in ‘Force and Signification’, Derrida argues that 
‘diaphanousness is the supreme value’ of phenomenology. 
In the opening of On Touching, of ‘Signing a question – from Aristotle’, Derrida turns 
back once more and more than once to many ghosts in asking about the place, space or 
interval of ‘the day’s phenomenality and its diaphanous visibility’ (3).  There is the apparent 
choice, the phenomenological choice par excellence, that has to be made between seeing and 
the visible which leads Derrida to gesture – without the hand, if such a thing is possible – to 
both seeing and the visible, to ‘both your gaze and your eyes’: always somewhere in between 
(2-3). 
In the opening pages of On Touching, there is also perhaps a fragmentary echo of 
Derrida’s unpublished 1967 seminar on sensible certitude in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(61-2).  In responding to the unavoidable hospitality of the question from Aristotle ‘is it 
daytime or are we already inhabiting our night?’, Derrida evokes Hegel’s trial in which 
writing is used in the attempt to preserve the truth, like a night storage, to keep language safe 
from the oscillations of sensible certainty.  There is also perhaps a distant blow or caress, 
somewhere always in between, from what Hegel had called Thales’ ‘clever saying’.  
According to Diogenes, when someone asked Thales ‘which came first, day or night, he 
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answered, “Night came first – by a day” ’.  What comes first, day or night, x or y?  Y comes 
first – after x.  In other words, what comes first has already been preceded.  It still comes 
first, but ‘first’ is something that cannot be distinguished from what it follows, as in a 
Nietzschean genealogy.  It is perhaps with these palintropes that Derrida begins On 
Touching, with a question from Aristotle.  Derrida takes us back to Aristotle. 
After having examined the previous and inadequate theories of the soul in De Anima, 
Aristotle doesn’t so much say what the soul is, as describe the perfect operation of the 
seamless concept.  The soul is actuality working with potentiality, form working with matter. 
The soul is ‘the cause or source’ of sensation (415b).  It is only by starting from the soul, that 
one can then turn to the dependence of sensation ‘on a process of movement or affection 
from without’ (416b).  Sensation is reliant on the ‘stimulation of external objects’, and this 
demonstrates that ‘what is sensitive is so only potentially, not actually’ (417a).  ‘The power 
of sense’, Aristotle insists, ‘never ignites itself, but requires an agent’.  But because it is only 
a living body, a body with a soul in it, that can be sensitive, the precedence of what is inside 
is in no way diminished by the dependence on what is outside.  The soul (actuality working 
on potentiality) is the possibility of sensation (potentiality in need of an external agent). 
It is from this basic architecture that Aristotle turns to the ‘objects of sense’ and the visible 
as the object of sight (418a).  Defining the relationship between light and colour as the origin 
of the visible Aristotle turns to the diaphanous, the transparent, to a seeing through.  ‘By 
diaphanous’, he writes, ‘I mean what is visible, and yet not visible, and not yet visible in 
itself, but rather owing its visibility to the colour of something else’ (418b).  Light, Aristotle 
argues, ‘exists whenever the potentially transparent is excited by actuality’ and, as a mirror of 
the soul, it reflects what Derrida had called in the Introduction ‘the invisible milieu of 
seeing’, the unseen Idea as the origin of phenomenology, and the soul – non-sensibility par 
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excellence – as the origin of the senses.  The diaphanous: the profound and enduring structure 
of the not x but the possibility of x. 
In his account of sound, hearing and the voice in De Anima Aristotle attempts to resolve a 
problem that arises in the senses between matter and form, and as Derrida suggests, it is only 
when he turns to touch that Aristotle will appear to solve this problem.  For Aristotle, actual 
sound requires that there is always more than one body: ‘it is impossible for one body only to 
generate a sound.  There must be ‘an impact’, something ‘striking against something else’.  A 
thing ‘must be struck with a sudden sharp blow, if it is to sound’ (419b).  For Aristotle, 
hearing contains this violence, but it in no way diminishes it.  The ‘air chamber’ inside the 
ear retains the ‘sudden sharp blow’ that has come from outside (420a).  But hearing remains 
reliant on that fact that there must always be something ‘striking against something else’, 
something outside.  Aristotle attempts to counteract this reliance through the voice.  Voice is 
‘the impact of the inbreathed air against the windpipe’ and the soul is ‘the agent that produces 
the impact’.  In other words, the soul is the author of an internal violence that makes the 
voice possible.  This violence of the soul must guarantee that the necessary violence of 
‘something else’, of something outside, can lead only to an articulate voice, to a voice with 
meaning: ‘what produces the impact must have soul in it and must be accompanied by an act 
of imagination, for voice is a sound with meaning’ (420b). 
As is well known, in the 1960s and early 1970s Derrida challenged this Aristotelian 
legacy.  Lévinas, he argued, treats ‘the sound of thought as intelligible speech’ and hearing as 
an ideality that surpasses the sensibility of sound, while Hegel perpetuates the logic of ‘the 
invisible ideality of a logos which-hears-itself-speak’.  The diaphanous will always privilege 
the ear over the eye.  From Aristotle to Hegel and beyond, Derrida argued, the eardrum is at 
once an internal buffer that regulates and orders the sudden sharp blows of the outside on the 
inside, and a membrane that cannot stop vibrating and registering something – always more 
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than one body – ‘striking against something else’, something outside.  The Aristotelian ear, 
that fabulous Greek machine designed ‘to balance internal pressures and external pressures’, 




As Derrida suggests, long before it became a ‘master word’ for Nancy, the elusive balance 
of the ear and the authority of the diaphanous is founded on the immaculate birth of 
exactness, and it is touch that gives the highest exactness to humans: ‘While in respect of all 
the other senses we fall below many species of animals’, Aristotle writes, ‘in respect of touch 
we far excel all other species in exactness of discrimination.  This is why man is the most 
intelligent of animals’ (421a).  Touch is a sign of intelligence, it accounts for the human 
capacity for ‘exactness of discrimination’.  First and foremost, touch describes the capacity to 
arrive at an exact – an ideal and pure – difference.   
For Aristotle, the sense of touch is founded on a fundamental and exact distinction 
between form and matter.  ‘A sense’, he writes ‘is what has the power of receiving into itself 
the sensible forms of things without the matter’ (424a).  Unlike plants, which cannot make a 
distinction between the form and matter of sensible objects, from the start we have made an 
exact discrimination, and not only separated but also excluded matter from the senses (424b).  
The five senses in general, Aristotle argues, form a unified apparatus of exact discrimination.  
Each sense is a ratio, a balancing mechanism that avoids the extremes (the too bright or too 
dark, the too loud or too quiet, the too hot or too cold) that leave one senseless.  The senses 
are a unity that ‘discriminates the differences’ and avoids excess (426b).  This wondrous 
machine, this five-in-one, is the work of the soul, the psyche. 
For Aristotle, this need for the form of a medium or media is inherent in each sense.  
Poised between extremes (too bright, too loud) seeing and hearing require that there is no 
 8 
‘immediate contact’ with an object.  If something is lying on the eye or ear it cannot be seen 
or heard.  For the senses to work, there must be ‘something in between’ (419a).  ‘The same, 
in spite of all appearances’, Aristotle argues, ‘applies also to touch and taste’ (419a). 
Because there are a number of different kinds of tangible perceptions, as Derrida points 
out, (taste and touch, the tongue and the skin) and because of the human capacity for 
‘exactness of discrimination’, the source of touching and of its ability to mediate is more than 
the flesh and is ‘situated farther inward’ (422b).  Aristotle warns that we cannot use ‘contact 
with the flesh’ to reach – to touch – the internal origins of touching, and he illustrates this by 
noting that if a kind of prosthetic skin were attached or even grafted to the body it would still 
tell us little about the fine discriminations of touching (422b-423a).  In other words, as 
Derrida implies, Aristotle takes account of, counts on tekhne in his treatment of touch. 
 ‘We perceive everything through a medium’, Aristotle writes, but the medium of touch is 
distinctive (423b).  When it comes to touching, ‘we are affected not by but along with the 
medium’ (423b).  The medium is part of the message.  Returning to the problem of the 
unavoidable sudden sharp blow from the outside in his account of seeing, hearing and 
speaking, Aristotle describes this unique inclusion of the medium in the sense as the violent 
reverberation of a shield being struck: ‘it is as if a man were struck through his shield, where 
the shock is not first given to the shield and passed on to the man, but the concussion of both 
is simultaneous’.  When it comes to hearing, the ‘air chamber’ of the ear mediates the 
medium and the inside balances the force of the blow from the outside.  When it comes to 
touch, however, there is it seems no time for such a natural homeostasis.  Touching is what 
happens when the external blow hits the outside and the inside simultaneously.  Touch is a 
simultaneous concussion of the external and the internal.   
As Derrida suggests, Aristotle attempts to counteract the force of this argument by turning 
back to the soul.  The flesh is the medium of touch, but the ‘power of perceiving the tangible 
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is seated inside’ (423b).  It is only this power that is ‘seated inside’ that can mediate, discern 
and confirm the form-matter, actual-potential dynamic: ‘touch has for its object both what is 
tangible and what is intangible’.  But as Derrida points out, in a passage that can also be seen 
as an oblique criticism of Agamben’s celebration of the diaphanous self-sufficiency of 
potentiality, the fact that sensation ‘is only potential’ means that sense cannot ‘sense itself’: 
sense ‘does not auto-affect itself without the motion of an exterior object’ (6).  The internal 
power of touch is, in itself and to itself, insufficient.  It is always in need of the other – the 
other that is outside, and the other that moves. 
For Derrida, when it comes to touch there is always the precedence of a gap that moves or, 
as Nancy suggests, a ‘syncopated noncoincidence’ (192).  For there to be place or touch, 
there ‘must be spacing before it is space’, there must be ‘an interval’ that is ‘neither sensible 
nor intelligible’ (24).  To touch, there must already be gap of and as contact (181, 229).  This 
is even the case when we try to touch ourselves: ‘the I self-touches spacing itself out, losing 
contact with itself, precisely in touching itself’ (34).  For Derrida, this irreducible gap, this 
gaping – as spacing, as the elusive possibility of touching another or oneself – should not be 
confused with the long tradition of touch as the idealization of the ‘other as untouchable’ 
(92).  In failing to touch the untouchable other, whatever is reaching out to the other, 
ultimately, only ‘touches itself’ and loses contact – with itself (104, 108-9).  Touching, one is 
always touching the (moving gaps of the) other. 
For Aristotle, the architecture of a soul filled touching rests on defining it as ‘exactness of 
discrimination’.  Since his early readings of Husserl, Derrida had associated exactitude with 
idealization – with an ‘exact and nonsensible ideality’ that arises from ‘a sensible ideality’.  
In ‘Le facteur de la vérité’ (1971-1975), Derrida notes Lacan’s evocation of an ‘exactitude’ 
that treats literature as ‘something that stages and makes visible, with no specific intervention 
of its own, like a transparent element, a general diaphanousness’.  It is perhaps not fortuitous 
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that a few pages before this Derrida makes one of his earliest references to Nancy.  For 
Derrida, Nancy seems to at once to echo the Aristotelian tradition of exactness and to exceed 
it: ‘Nancy is the thinker of the exorbitant and exactitude at the same time’.  He is concerned 
with an ‘exorbitant exactitude’, an exactitude that remains ‘faithful to the excess of the 
exorbitant’.  Derrida will later call this Nancy’s ‘exact hyperbole’ (26, 46). 
For Aristotle, touch as discrimination, as mediation, as life, is predicated on resisting and 
refusing the destructive force of all ‘tangible excess’.  ‘In the beginning’, Derrida argues, 
‘there is abstinence’, but this abstinence is already founded on the possibility of touching the 
untouchable.  Starting with Aristotle, touch cannot avoid the ‘hyperdialectical’ (touching 
without touching, contact without contact) and, beyond this, the disturbing hyperbole of 
touching (the blows and caresses) that exceed both the exact and the inexact (47, 67-9).  
Even in the midst of insisting on the life preserving mediation of the senses, of the unseen 
and unfelt work of the soul as the ‘exactness of discrimination’, Aristotle cannot avoid what 
Derrida had first called in 1972 ‘the blows from the outside’. 
Taking up Aristotle’s admission that the tangible seems to entail a multiplicity of senses 
(422b), Derrida treats the tangible indeterminacy of the blow and the caress as a touch that is 
not ‘necessarily human’.  The blow and the caress exceed the Aristotelian classifications.  ‘A 
blow’, Derrida suggests, ‘is perhaps not a kind of destructive touching, indeed, of the 
excessive tangibility that, as Aristotle already noted, can have devastating effects.’  The 
caress is also ‘not only a species of soothing, beneficial, and pleasant touch, pleasure enjoyed 
by contact’.  Beyond good and evil, beyond the exact and the inexact, ‘a caress may be a 
blow and visa versa’ (69). 
 For Derrida, the philosophies of touch, in particular those post-war French philosophies 
that responded to the work of Husserl, while never straying that far from the questions of 
Christianity, are always starting again and always too late with Aristotle.  He writes: 
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But they already know that this thinking of touch, this thought of what “touching” 
means, must touch on the untouchable.  Aristotle’s Peri psuches had already 
insisted on this: both the tangible and the intangible are the objects of touch. 
Once this incredible “truth” has been uttered, it will resonate down to the 
twentieth century, even within discourses apparently utterly foreign to any 
Aristotelianism (18). 
 
What distinguishes Nancy, Derrida argues, is an emphasis on prosthetics that attempts to 
resist the  ‘the pure life of the living’ and the ‘immediate continuity’ of intuition (19, 56, 
127).  At the same time, while Nancy links the possibility of exactitude to the spacing and 
tekhne of a prosthetics that exceeds the phusis of touch, he also associates it with a certain 
starting again, with a relaunching, a resurrection or salvation that Derrida treats as a 
repetition of Aristotelianism that is still prevalent – and perhaps most of all – in Nancy’s call 
for a ‘deconstruction of Christianity’ (8, 128-29) 
The ‘deconstruction of Christianity’, Derrida argues, begins with ‘the Christian body’, a 
seemingly intact and unique body to be deconstructed (218-19).  It also presupposes that 
there is an outside of Christianity, an outside or ‘passage beyond itself’ that, precisely, 
Christianity par excellence has always taken account of.  Christianity has always had the 
‘ability to part without parting’.  This is an exactitude that always takes account of its own 
hyperbole: ‘For a certain Christianity will always take charge of the most exacting, the most 
exact, and the most eschatological hyperbole of deconstruction’ (59, 60, 54). 
 ‘Aristotle has not left us for a moment’, Derrida insists (47).  Aristotle’s Peri psuches, he 
notes, ‘begins by explaining to us, at the very outset, what one is to begin with’ (18).  For 
Aristotle, the dynamic of matter as that which is always ready and form as that which is 
always there resolves any apparent problems of precedence.  Passive matter can be first, 
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because it is always potential matter.  What is always ready (potentiality) is always on its 
way to what is always there (actuality).  As Aristotle observes, ‘in the individual, potential 
knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it is not prior even in time’ 
(430a).  ‘All things’, he insists, ‘that come into being arise from what actually is’ (431a).  
Potential matter can be first, because to be potential, it must already start with and start from 
‘what actually is’.  This is the ontology of Aristotle.  As Derrida remarks, ‘the fullness of 
immediate presence signifies above all the actuality of what gives itself effectively, 
energetically, actually’ (120).  It is because potential knowledge is not prior ‘even in time’, 
Aristotle writes, to actual knowledge that ‘actual knowledge is identical with its object’ 
(430a).  For Aristotle, thought – which is always of and from the soul – is always thinkable, 
always ‘becoming all things’, always ‘separable, impassible, unmixed’, always separable 
from matter, body and sensation, because ‘when separated it is alone just what it is’: 
‘immortal and eternal’.  It is the soul.  This is where Hegel begins and ends: with a thought 




At one point, between two notches or gaps in the right-hand column of Glas, Derrida 
gestures to a reading of Heidegger’s What is Called Thinking?, that he turns back to in On 
Touching (297).  We are still not thinking, Heidegger insists.  Drawn towards what 
withdraws, we must learn to think, to answer and respond to what withdraws.  Thinking 
begins with ‘an anticipatory reaching out for something that is reached by our call, through 
our calling’.  It is an appeal to what ‘remains to be thought’, a call to what remains – and 
remains to respond, to come.  As Heidegger had first suggested in Being and Time, the 
temporalization of temporality, ‘a future which makes present in the process of having been’, 
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opens the question of the future possibilities of the past: the past always has a future.  
Thought is the thinking of the past for the future.  Thinking is the gift – without present.   
But, as Derrida suggests, it is already too late to stop, and for Heidegger ‘what remains to 
be thought about’ also arises out of  ‘the gathering of thought’ (die Versammlung des 
Denkens), of a ‘thinking back’ or ‘recollection’.  Thinking always re-calls, thinks back, re-
collects and centres the past for the future.  For Heidegger, thinking inexorably takes us back, 
first to Socrates and the logos until, finally, we must start again with Parmenides. 
From at least his 1984 memorial lectures for Paul de Man to his 1989 paper marking the 
hundredth anniversary of the birth of Martin Heidegger, Derrida associated Heidegger’s 
emphasis on die Versammlung des Denkens with an originary gathering, a gathering of the 
start, a re-gathering back to the start.  In ‘Heidegger’s Ear’, he writes: ‘At bottom 
logocentricism is perhaps not so much the gesture that consists in placing the lógos at the 
center as the interpretation of lógos as Versammlung, that is the gathering that precisely 
concenters what it configures’.  At the same time, since at least 1984, Derrida had also raised 
the question of a ‘non-architectonic Versammlung’ and in ‘Heidegger’s Ear’ he gestures to 
the polemos of an Auseinandersetzung (a debate) that opens not only ‘the joints or couplings’ 
of the Versammlung, but also the distances and disjunctions of ‘the faults, the intervals, the 
gaps’.  In On Touching, which was written not so long after this, Derrida refers to an 
Auseinandersetzung (21, 36). 
In the gaps in the columns of Glas devoted to What is Called Thinking? Derrida writes: 
‘one can try to displace this necessity only by thinking the remain(s) outside the horizon of 
essence, outside the thought of being.  The remain(s) does not come-to-essence’.  The 
necessity here that ‘one can try to displace’ refers to the reading of Hegel between the gaps 
and notches on Heidegger.  For Hegel, in the history of spirit the ‘content of spirit’ can only 
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be spiritual.  When thought thinks itself thinking the truth, spirit has always already taken 
care of the content, of the matter or the weight of thought.   
At the Last Supper, Jesus speaks to his disciples at the table, and Derrida asks in Glas, 
‘What then is Jesus doing when he says while breaking the bread: take this, this is my body 
given for you, do this in memory of me?  Why already memory in the present feeling?  Why 
does he present himself, in the present, before the hour, as cut off from his very own body 
and following his obsequy?’.  When difference is put to work by the Aufhebung in the name 
of the history of spirit, when copulation is destined for virginity and conception for the 
immaculate concept, Derrida suggests, thought thinking itself thinking the truth becomes 
thinking as memory.  Derrida here, once again, returns to the problem of the proximity of 
Erinnerung, Gedächtnis, and Denken, remembering, memory and thought. 
In his reading of the Last Supper in Glas, Derrida writes: ‘Think me [pensez-moi], Jesus 
says to his friends while burdening their arms, in advance, with a bloody corpse’.  This is 
how it all starts for thinking: in advance, with the body of Christ as the burden of thought, as 
the weight of thought, of thinking as the interiorization, the idealization, the 
transubstanziation of the (dead) body, the weight (lessness) of thought: think me – pensez 
moi.  One can see the legacy of this burden of thought and as thought, for example, in The 
Pilgrim’s Progress: ‘Then I saw in my Dream, That Christian asked him further, If he could 
not help him off with this burden that was upon his back; For as yet he had not got rid 
thereof, nor could he by any means get it off without help.  He told him, As to the burden, be 
content to bear it, until thou comest to the place of Deliverance; for there it will fall from thy 
back itself’ (29). 
For Derrida, in marking the strange and strained relation in French between penser (to 
think) and peser (to weigh), thinking seems to be neither simply a weighing up, spirit taking 
account of matter, nor merely a weighing down, matter taking account of spirit, but always 
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somewhere in between.  Pe(n)ser – does not have the weight(lessness) for an idealising re-
collection. 
For Hegel, Derrida writes, ‘matter is not free.  It weighs, it goes towards the bottom’. 
Matter is heavy and thinking has its weight.  Obliquely recalling Heidegger’s emphasis on 
thinking as a turning towards what turns away or a calling back to what has been gathered, 
Derrida: ‘If the gravity and the dispersion of matter to the outside are analyzed, one should 
recognize there a tendency, an effort tending toward unity and the gathering of self’.  As he 
suggests, for Hegel matter is ‘a tendency toward the center and unity’ and it can neither 
oppose nor follow this tendency without ceasing to be matter: ‘to be opposed to its own 
tendency, to itself, to matter, it must be spirit.  And if it yields to this tendency it is still 
spirit’.  In the Hegelian configuration, matter is somewhat like not-being for Parmenides: to 
not be being, it must be and there can be no opposite of being: matter can only be spirit.  But 
at the same time, as Derrida had suggested in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, in the Sophist the 
Stranger acknowledges that not-being has a relative (and not an absolute) difference in 
relation to being. 
For Hegel, matter has no essence and this is why it can only tend towards spirit.  For 
Derrida, it is only when the ‘weight or gravity’ (pesanteur) of matter is not taken as ‘the 
search for unity’ that one can perhaps think anything else than spirit thinking itself thinking 
the truth.  In Of Grammatology, in other words long before Nancy’s The Gravity of Thought, 
Derrida had already alluded to this difficult inheritance of weighing and thinking: ‘thought is 
here for me a perfectly neutral name, the blank part of the text, the necessarily indeterminate 
index of a future epoch of différance … This thought has no weight.  It is, in the play of the 
system, the very thing which never has weight’. 
In On Touching, Derrida returns (but has he ever left?) to this question of ‘thinking as 
memory’ and of ‘the unthinkable and unweighable’ (35, 62).  Responding to Nancy’s 
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evocation of a discordant ‘co-appropriation of thinking and weighing’ that is indicative of a 
sense, a sense where existence precedes essence, a sense as ‘the without-essence’, Derrida 
suggests that this sense without essence tends to, is co-ordinated by, the exactitude of an 
inaccessibility which determines ‘the whole weight of thought’.  Derrida, in contrast, 
proposes to define ‘weight as that which, in touch, is marked as tangible by the opposed 
resistance … the place of alterity or absolute inappropriability’ (72-74, 295).  He then turns 
from this marking or definition through the resistance of the other back to thinking: thought, 
he writes, ‘thinks only there where the counterweight of the other weighs enough so that it 
begins to think, that is, in spite of itself, when it touches or lets itself be touched against its 
will.  That is why it will never think, it will never have begun to think by itself’ (299).  
Thinking is unthinkable, unweighable, startling even, perhaps because it is already a thinking 
of and as the senses, an unavoidable accessibility or hospitality even, an interlacing 
oscillation, a thinking that turns backwards, once more, always more than once, a thinking of 
palintropes. 
In his fifty years of reading On the Soul, Derrida offered what amounts to a ‘new’ history 
of the senses (a history that is always à venir), tracing the gaps of and in each of the senses, 
and the gaps of and between each of the senses: plus de cinq – not only five, more than five, 
never five-in-one.  Derrida’s reading of Aristotle in On Touching suggests that we still have 
yet to interpret ‘Bottom’s Dream’: ‘The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not 
seen, man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report what my 
dream was’.  ‘One day, yes, one day, once upon a time, a terrific time, a time terrifically 
addressed, with as much violence as tact at its finger tips, a certain question took hold of me’. 
